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Abstract
In India, caste shapes access to a variety of resources and outcomes mainly
through its influence on inter-generational prosperity, but also the linked phe-
nomenon of discrimination. This paper examines whether caste-based differences
in access to formal agricultural loans reflect discrimination in banks’ lending. We
find, first, that there are significant caste-based differences in loan application rates.
Having controlled for the decision to seek credit and various borrower characteris-
tics, we also find that loan approval rates across castes are largely equal across
three of four caste-groups, but that Scheduled Tribe (ST) borrowers are less likely
to have loans approved. Through a simulation-based approach, we show that these
lower approval rates for STs are most likely not explained by unobserved credit
histories, suggesting that banks do discriminate against STs. We discuss the policy
implications that arise from these findings.
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1 Introduction
Caste as a form of social identity remains an enduring predictor of economic status
in India. It is correlated with occupation and employment (Prakash, 2015; Ito, 2009;
Thorat and Attewell, 2007), income and expenditure (Deshpande, 2000), and capital more
generally (Kijima, 2006). Caste thus remains an important indicator of socioeconomic
disadvantage. One important avenue through which caste can influence income and
productivity in the rural sector is by shaping access to agricultural credit. Agriculture
is the largest employer in India, and due to the gap between sowing and harvest credit
is usually needed to be able to purchase various inputs (Conning and Udry, 2007). The
question of whether caste influences access to credit is thus important, and while there is
a general agreement that it does (Kumar, 2013; Pal, 2002; Government of India, 2007),
the reasons for these differences are less clear. One particular concern is whether lenders
discriminate on the basis of caste (Kumar, 2013; Dréze et al., 1997).
This paper delves into why caste influences access to agricultural credit, and whether
banks discriminate on the basis on caste. We use nationally-representative data from the
2011-12 round of the India Human Development Survey (Desai and Vanneman, 2015),
which enables us to study the decision to apply for a loan separately from the subsequent
approval of this application. Previous studies in this area have studied the determinants of
access to credit including caste (Kumar, 2013; Pal, 2002) and whether farmers are credit-
constrained (Kochar, 1997). These studies control for credit-worthiness characteristics
including land-ownership, household demographics, and indicators of economic status,
but do not control for the decision to seek credit. To our knowledge, our paper is the
first attempt to study agricultural lending using data that include information about loan
applications, thus enabling us to explicitly distinguish between lender-based differences
in loan approval rates and borrower-based differences in the demand for credit.
To make sense of caste-based discrimination in accessing credit, it is useful to note the
parallels with discrimination in labor markets (Thorat and Attewell, 2007; Altonji and
Blank, 1999) and the role of racial and gender-based discrimination in accessing bank
credit in the USA (e.g. Blanchflower et al., 2003; Blanchard et al., 2008; Asiedu et al.,
2010). The definition of discrimination commonly employed in economics to study this
phenomenon was proposed by Gary Becker (1971). Discrimination occurs if the differences
in some outcome (loan approvals, wages) based on race, caste, or a similar attribute, are
not ‘objective’. That is, if residual differences remain even after taking into account
all possible borrower or worker characteristics that are relevant to the outcome, and
are attributed to a ‘taste’ for discrimination on the part of the bank or employer. Vice-
versa, discrimination due to ‘objective’ reasons – credit worthiness, ability – can be called
statistical discrimination. A third way in which outcomes might differ systematically by
caste or gender or race is if expectations depend on belonging to a certain such category.
For instance, members of one group might be less likely to expect, and thus demand,
better pay (Chevalier, 2007).
In this paper we attempt to distinguish between these three phenomena. Castes are
usually categorised into four major groups, viz. Scheduled Castes (SCs; the most disad-
vantaged), Other Backward Classes(OBCs; of middling disadvantage), Brahmins/Others,
the traditionally privileged higher castes, and Scheduled Tribes (STs; also very disadvan-
taged).1,2,3 Analysing the decision to apply for credit, we are able to estimate caste-wise
residual differences in loan application rates having controlled for various indicators of
socio-economic status.
Our first main finding is that a major part of caste-wise differences in access to loans
can be explained by differences in application rates. These differences mirror patterns of
socioeconomic disadvantage, but persist even after accounting for socioeconomic status.
1There is substantial and enduring complexities and political agitation around the categorisation of
castes as OBC (Ramaiah, 1992).
2STs are not technically part of the caste system. Yet tribals are one of the most disadvantaged
peoples in India, and most analyses of caste therefore include the ST category, as does the current paper.
3It is generally agreed that the caste system applies not only to Hindus but to followers of other
religions in the Indian subcontinent as well.
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SCs and STs, the two most disadvantaged groups, are 16-20% less likely to apply for
loans than are Brahmins and OBCs. We cannot explain why these differences exist,
but a likely explanation seems that they reflect expectations about loan approval, which
therefore reflect caste-wise disadvantage in other realms of life.
Next, by analysing loan approvals for those who applied, we aim to isolate taste-based
discrimination from plausible sources of statistical discrimination. As a first attempt, we
control for the covariates plausibly linked to credit-worthiness in an agricultural context,
and interpret caste-wise residuals as evidence of lenders’ taste discrimination. Our second
main finding is that once the decision to seek credit is controlled for, Brahmins, OBCs
and SCs all have near-equal chances of having a loan approved, but that ST borrowers
are 5-7% less likely to have a loan approved.
Yet our data are observational, and it is possible that an important unobservable might
lead to an underlying caste-wise statistical difference being (mis)interpreted as evidence
of taste-based discrimination. We examine this possibility through a simulation approach,
and we believe this is an important methodological contribution of the paper. We adapt
an approach suggested by Ichino et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to sim-
ulate a binary ‘credit history’ variable, since credit histories are not recorded in our data,
but could be important determinants of loan approvals. We then study how the residual
effect of caste-group belonging on loan approvals changes with different distributional
assumptions for these simulated credit histories. Through this exercise, we argue that
the lower loan approval rates for STs are likely robust to STs being poorer credit risks as
a group, or in other words, that STs do likely face taste-based discrimination from banks.
Finally, we divide our data into subpopulations and analyse these separately to further
investigate caste-based differences. We find that the apparent discrimination against STs
is visible mainly in states with substantial ST populations, and not where they are a
small minority. We also divide the sample according to land ownership to indirectly
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examine affirmative action guidance provided by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).While
caste-based reservations in government jobs and in admissions to educational institutions
(Bertrand et al., 2010) are more prominent affirmative action initiatives, the RBI has long
directed bank lending towards disadvantaged groups (Reserve Bank of India, 2014, 2004,
2008; Sriram, 2007). These policies are especially significant for agricultural lending in
rural India, where expanding formal bank credit is thought to be key to increasing rural
incomes, and they encourage banks to lend to ‘small’ farmers, viz. those who own at
most 5 acres of land. We find indirect evidence as to the success of this guidance, since
caste-wise patterns for loan applications and approvals are very muted for small farmers,
and the overall patterns of difference are in effect explained by lending patterns amongst
larger farmers.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data, while
section 3 lays out our empirical approach. Results are presented in section 4, and section
5 discusses their implications.
2 Data
We use data from the second round of the India Human Development Survey, a nationally-
representative household survey undertaken in 2011-12 (Desai and Vanneman, 2015).
These data provide information on a rich set of social, economic and demographic char-
acteristics which are well suited to analysing the determinants of households’ borrowing
and debt from formal and informal sources. We focus only on bank, i.e. formal sec-
tor loans in the current paper. Such loans are widely considered superior than what
the informal sector provides, owing to the usurious lending practices in the latter. The
question of caste-based differences is therefore of policy and more general importance for
the formal sector. It is also usually assumed that given a choice, farmers would opt for
formal sector loans (e.g. Kochar, 1997). Therefore, excluding informal sector borrowings
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is also unlikely to compromise the identification of caste-based differences in application
and approval rates for formal sector loans.
This survey is especially useful since households were asked not only to list what loans they
did have, but crucially, whether they had applied for loans from various sources, and the
success of those applications. In the Indian context this question is critical to exploring
whether any caste-wise differences in loan patterns do indeed reflect discrimination on
the part of lenders, and to our knowledge, no other large-scale household survey in India
has asked this question.4 As per the questionnaire, details about agricultural bank loans
in terms of outstanding loans, applications, and approvals, refer to a loan taken during
the five years preceding the survey from a bank for the stated purpose of furthering
agricultural business or purchasing agricultural equipment.
The second round of the IHDS data currently consist of individual and household-level
information, but village-level information are covered only in the first round of the survey
that took place in 2004-05. In particular, the presence of a bank in the village or distance
to the nearest such is potentially an important covariate that helps control for loan supply.
But, since the data on village covariates are from the earlier survey round, we present
results with and without including them.
We focus on farmer households, which we define as those households who report that a)
their main occupation is cultivation, and b) that they cultivate land. In terms of regions,
we exclude Jammu and Kashmir, the North-Eastern states, and small states and Union
Territories since these account for very few loans. Table 1 presents means and proportions
for all variables by caste-group, and all statistics shown are population estimates that
take survey weights into account, as do all our estimations.
Caste-wise means and proportions follow expected patterns in that land ownership, rent-
4The National Sample Survey Organisation’s All India Debt and Investment Survey is the other main
source of information on household’s access to credit. This is a decennial survey, conducted most recently
in 2013. In keeping with previous rounds, it asks about the details of existing loans but does not ask
about loan applications.
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Table 1: Means and proportions by caste-group
N=7,510 Brahmin OBC SC ST
Loans
Proportion currently have loan 0.326 0.337 0.215 0.169
Proportion applied for loan 0.353 0.362 0.238 0.207
Proportion loan approved if applied (N=2,587) 0.922 0.930 0.901 0.815
Land and income
Land owned (acres) 15.824 11.819 7.028 10.187
Land rented in (acres) 2.156 2.633 2.303 1.573
Land rented out (acres) 1.912 1.539 1.262 1.186
Monthly consumption expenditure (Rs. ‘000) 128.383 105.529 82.755 61.398
Annual income (Rs. ‘000) 129.444 88.313 64.671 50.677
Education and household composition
Age of household head 53.533 52.019 51.067 49.269
Proportion with male household head 0.943 0.945 0.945 0.916
Years of education highest male 8.529 7.213 6.108 5.399
Years of education highest female 5.971 4.132 3.462 2.680
Household size 5.298 5.360 5.216 5.258
Household proportion of adult males 0.379 0.353 0.340 0.340
Household proportion of adult females 0.365 0.354 0.348 0.344
Village characteristics
Distance to nearest bank branch (km) 5.784 5.928 6.590 8.573
Distance to nearest town/city (km) 14.328 15.559 16.538 22.136
Percentage of households with electricity 63.317 58.907 55.715 45.742
State population proportions
Himachal Pradesh 0.667 0.084 0.222 0.027
Punjab 0.730 0.169 0.101 0.000
Uttarakhand 0.228 0.234 0.538 0.000
Haryana 0.559 0.362 0.076 0.003
Rajasthan 0.181 0.545 0.156 0.118
Uttar Pradesh 0.279 0.593 0.127 0.000
Bihar 0.275 0.620 0.091 0.014
West Bengal 0.483 0.184 0.297 0.036
Jharkhand 0.134 0.266 0.100 0.499
Orissa 0.099 0.511 0.174 0.215
Chhattisgarh 0.011 0.481 0.078 0.430
Madhya Pradesh 0.229 0.477 0.094 0.201
Gujarat 0.327 0.441 0.049 0.183
Maharashtra 0.362 0.475 0.062 0.101
Andhra Pradesh 0.311 0.485 0.181 0.023
Karnataka 0.284 0.565 0.070 0.081
Kerala 0.637 0.303 0.061 0.000
Tamil Nadu 0.069 0.720 0.191 0.021
Notes:
This table presents means and proportions by caste group. All statistics are estimates for the population that
take into account survey probability weights.
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ing and leasing, incomes, and access to credit are all higher for Brahmins and OBCs,
followed by SCs and then STs. It notable that the figure for incomes is lower than that
for consumption expenditure, even though the former is an annual figure and the latter
monthly. The survey documentation (Desai and Vanneman, 2015) offers two reasons for
this: first, several incomes are negative, reflecting the precarious nature of cultivator
livelihoods. Second, calculating incomes is notoriously difficult when several components
are measured in kind.5
3 Empirical framework
Our analysis seeks to estimate the residual effects of caste belonging on the demand for
loans, as well as their subsequent approval. We use Logit specifications to model both the
decision to apply for an agricultural loan, and conditional on this, the bank approving
this application.
For household i, let Y1i and Y2i denote the binary outcomes of applying for an agricultural
bank loan and, respectively, having this application approved and thus receiving a loan.
We model the probability of each outcome using a logit specification:
Prob[Yj = 1|X] = e
X′β
1 + eX′β
where j ∈ {1, 2} (1)
Here X is a vector of covariates that includes caste-group dummies and β is a vector of
coefficients that we seek to estimate.
Unbiased estimation of the residual effects of caste-group on loan applications and the ap-
proval thereof requires controlling for household characteristics that influence the decision
to apply for credit, and, respectively, to the bank’s decision to approve that application.
5This pattern is also borne out by data from the National Sample Survey Organisation. See table 2
in Mishra (2008)
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To this end we include variables known to influence access to credit (see, for example,
Pal, 2002; Swain, 2007), including household income and land owned – the latter the
primary form of collateral demanded by banks.6
Second, we must control for the supply of loans. For loan applications, distance to the
nearest bank (including if such is present in the village) is an important indicator both
of supply as well as a potential proxy of a bank’s knowledge about potential borrowers.
We include this distance as a village-level covariate, together with two indicators of
development and connectedness, viz. the proportion of households with electricity, and
the distance to the nearest town/city. Unfortunately the data on these covariates are not
ideal, since they are from an earlier round of the IHDS survey conducted in 2004-05.
Analyses of racial discrimination in access to mortgage or small business loans typically
also control for past repayment histories and default behaviour (e.g. Blanchflower et al.,
2003). Since credit ratings and the bureaus that maintain such information are not
prevalent in the rural Indian context, it is unlikely that banks use such information sys-
tematically. Nonetheless, credit histories or ratings are a potentially important influence
on loan applications, and to the extent that they might be correlated with caste-group,
their exclusion could lead to biased estimates. In particular, information on repayment
rates or credit histories is important to distinguish between statistical discrimination
(owing to caste-repayment correlation), and taste-based discrimination. We can infer the
latter should residual caste-wise differences persist even after controlling for repayment
histories.
However, the data do not provide information on repayment histories or a suitable proxy.
Instead, we therefore examine their potential role through a Monte-Carlo simulation
technique adapted from Ichino et al. (2008). This approach tests the sensitivity of our
estimation results to the presence of an unobservable. Section 4.1 details the method,
6According to the Reserve Bank of India’s guidelines, banks should not demand collateral for loans of
up to Rs 50,000, and for larger loans, land is the main form of collateral (Reserve Bank of India, 2007).
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and the intuition is as follows. Excluding credit histories would lead to biased estimation
provided credit histories are correlated with caste-group as well as a bank’s decision
to lend. Thus, we can simulate a variable that is correlated with both a caste-group
of interest and loan approvals and re-estimate our results. Using Monte-Carlo draws
and varying the correlation between the simulated variable and, respectively, caste-group
and loan approval, we can study the distribution of caste-group residuals by repeatedly
re-estimating the model. The difference between these distributions and the estimates
obtained without the simulated variable provide a handle on the sensitivity of results,
and thus the potential importance of credit histories.
4 Results
The first three rows of table 1 provide (unadjusted) caste-wise proportions in terms of
access to credit. The first row confirms that there exist substantial inter-caste differences
in loan access, and in particular, SC and ST borrowers have relatively low access to credit.
These proportions are the type of statistic provided in official reports such as National
Sample Survey Organisation (2005), and previous analyses essentially examine how these
proportions change once borrower characteristics are accounted for, but do not differ-
entiate between loan applications and their approval (e.g. Kumar, 2013). In contrast,
this paper aims to investigate the role of caste in both applications and approvals. The
second row shows that inter-caste differences in loan applications might indeed explain
patterns of overall access in part. Third row suggests that loan approvals are also not uni-
form across all caste-groups: while around 90% of loan applications by Brahmins, OBCs
and SCs are approved, the proportion for STs is only 81.5%. Our empirical approach
thus aims to rigorously examine the loan application and approval statistics, and analyse
the extent of residual inter-caste differences that remain once we control for household
characteristics that proxy ability, credit-worthiness, and access.
9
Ta
bl
e
2:
Lo
gi
t
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
M
od
el
Lo
an
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
Lo
an
ap
pr
ov
al
s
O
B
C
S
C
S
T
O
B
C
S
C
S
T
(1
)
St
at
e
du
m
m
ie
s
1.
02
1
0.
55
5
0.
46
7
1.
09
9
0.
82
4
0.
36
9
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.3
04
)
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.1
36
)
p=
0.
00
0
p=
0.
00
9
(2
)
M
od
el
1
pl
us
la
nd
an
d
in
co
m
ea
1.
22
2
0.
80
2
0.
65
6
1.
25
2
1.
03
3
0.
45
4
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.3
33
)
(0
.3
60
)
(0
.1
63
)
p=
0.
00
0
p=
0.
02
6
(3
)
M
od
el
2
pl
us
ed
uc
at
io
n
an
d
b
1.
26
0
0.
84
6
0.
72
2
1.
38
7
1.
29
9
0.
54
1
ho
us
eh
ol
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.3
59
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.1
97
)
p=
0.
00
0
p=
0.
05
7
(4
)
M
od
el
3
pl
us
vi
lla
ge
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
sc
1.
25
5
0.
83
7
0.
74
6
1.
38
6
1.
29
3
0.
54
2
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.1
18
)
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.3
66
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.1
86
)
p=
0.
00
0
p=
0.
03
3
N
ot
es
:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
om
lo
gi
t
m
od
el
s.
O
nl
y
ca
st
e
du
m
m
y
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
sh
ow
n,
w
it
h
th
e
fu
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s
sh
ow
n
in
ap
pe
nd
ix
A
.C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
te
rm
s
of
od
ds
ra
ti
os
,w
it
h
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
T
he
ba
se
ca
te
go
ry
is
B
ra
hm
in
s.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
su
rv
ey
-w
ei
gh
te
d,
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
ac
co
un
t
fo
r
vi
lla
ge
-l
ev
el
cl
us
te
ri
ng
as
pe
r
th
e
su
rv
ey
de
si
gn
.
T
he
p-
va
lu
es
sh
ow
n
ar
e
fo
r
W
al
d
te
st
s
fo
r
th
e
nu
ll
th
at
al
lt
hr
ee
ca
st
e
du
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
jo
in
tl
y
ze
ro
.
Sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
is
7,
51
0
fo
r
lo
an
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
m
od
el
s
an
d
2,
58
7
fo
r
lo
an
ap
pr
ov
al
m
od
el
s.
a
L
an
d
ow
ne
d,
la
nd
re
nt
ed
ou
t,
la
nd
re
nt
ed
in
,
ho
us
eh
ol
d
m
on
th
ly
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e,
an
d
an
nu
al
in
co
m
e.
b
A
ge
an
d
se
x
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
he
ad
,
ye
ar
s
of
ed
uc
at
io
n
of
hi
gh
es
t-
ed
uc
at
ed
m
al
e
an
d
fe
m
al
e,
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
,
ho
us
eh
ol
d
pr
op
or
ti
on
of
ad
ul
t
m
al
es
an
d
fe
m
al
es
.
c
D
is
ta
nc
e
to
ne
ar
es
t
ba
nk
br
an
ch
,
di
st
an
ce
to
ne
ar
es
t
to
w
n/
ci
ty
,
pr
op
or
ti
on
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
w
it
h
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y.
10
Table 2 presents the estimation results from a series of Logit models. These are in terms of
odds ratios for respective caste dummies (full regression results are presented in appendix
A), and the bottom part of each row reports p-values from Wald tests of joint equality
of all three caste dummies.
We estimate two sets of models, one for loan applications (columns 2-4) and one for
their subsequent approval by a bank resulting in a loan (columns 5-7). In all cases the
Brahmin caste group is the base category. For instance, the first row says that in a
simplistic model that includes only state dummies, the odds ratio for an SC household
applying for a loan (respectively, having that application approved) relative to Brahmins
is 0.555 (respectively, 0.824). This simple model thus mirrors the unadjusted caste-wise
proportions in table 1.
Subsequent rows in table 2 show how respective odds ratios change as additional variables
are added to the model. Row 2 adds household-level characteristics including land owned,
rented out and rented in, and income and consumption expenditure, while row 3 adds
the age and sex of the household head, the years of education of the most educated male
and female members, household size, and the proportion of adult males and females.
Row 4 adds village-level information on distance to the nearest bank and to the nearest
town/city, and the proportion of households with electricity. In general, as we move
from simpler to more complex models, inter-caste differences in both applications and
approvals are reduced as more covariates are controlled for. The odds ratios become
closer to unity even though, as the p-values suggest, substantive inter-caste differences
persist.
To examine how these estimation results relate to unadjusted the caste-wise proportions
in table 1, we calculate the predicted probabilities of loan application and approval. We
report the sample-averaged predicted probabilities corresponding to model 4 in table
3 (those for model 3 are very similar, as the odds ratios would suggest). For these
11
Table 3: Predicted probabilities by caste group
Loan applications Loan approvals
Brahmin OBC SC ST Brahmin OBC SC ST
0.315 0.356 0.285 0.266 0.908 0.930 0.926 0.852
(0.015) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.033)
p=0.000 p=0.033
Notes:
This table shows sample-average probabilities by caste group predicted by model 4 in table 2.
Standard errors are given in parentheses, and p-values shown are for Wald tests for the null that the
predicted probabilities are equal across all four caste categories.
predictions, all variables except caste are held at their sample values, and the caste
variable is changed to Brahmin (say) to calculate the predicted probabilities for Brahmins,
and similarly for other caste-groups. The decision to hold all non-caste variables at their
sample values (rather then means, for instance) ensures that these calculations have
a genuine interpretation as the actual probabilities that would have resulted were all
households Brahmin (and so on). The bottom half of each row provides results from
Wald tests for comparisons of these caste-wise predictions, and these show that inter-
caste differences are also statistically significant.
Thus, columns 2-5 of table 3 show that loan applications vary by caste, in a way that
mirrors unadjusted proportions (table 1) but with attenuation. This pattern confirms
that residual inter-caste differences in loan application rates are an important factor
behind differences in overall access to credit. It also suggests, as we discuss in section
5 in detail, that attempts to reduce inter-caste disparities in this access are unlikely to
yield swift results, since at least for SC and ST borrowers, these inter-caste differences
might well reflect historical experiences of disadvantage and discrimination.
Next, columns 6-9 show that Brahmins, OBCs and SCs all have similar rates of loan
approval, but that the corresponding rate for STs is 5-7% lower. This marked residual
difference despite controlling for a rich set of relevant covariates suggests that banks might
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discriminate against STs. However, while we have controlled for important components
of credit-worthiness – in particular in the form of collateral (land) and incomes – the
data do not have information credit histories. We now investigate this issue through a
simulation approach, to gauge the potential influence of unobserved credit histories on
caste-group residuals for loan approvals.
4.1 A simulation approach to unobserved credit histories
Suppose that credit histories influence banks’ decisions to approve agricultural loans,
and that as a group, STs have inferior credit histories compared to non-STs. Then,
the residual negative effect of ST group-belonging on loan approvals might in fact get
partially or fully explained away by controlling for loan histories in equation 1. In other
words, while our results suggest that banks discriminate against STs, the absence of this
variable in the data means that we cannot infer whether the discrimination is statistical
– if STs have worse credit histories on average – or taste-based. This is a crucial question
from the perspective of understanding how banks, a central financial institution in rural
India, approach the question of caste, and indeed whether there are parallels here with
race and gender-based discrimination in other contexts.
We approach this problem using Monte-Carlo simulation, adapting an approach suggested
by Ichino et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Both papers investigate how
including a hitherto binary unobservable might change the estimate of a treatment effect.
They assume that assignment to treatment is not unconfounded if the unobservable is
excluded, but becomes so once it is controlled for. Ichino et al. (2008) implement this idea
for treatment effects estimation using propensity score matching, and propose a simple
way of parameterising the distribution of the binary unobservable. Partitioning the set of
observations into four quadrants according to (binary) treatment status and (also binary)
outcome, four corresponding probabilities that the unobservable equals one are specified.
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Monte-Carlo draws are used to construct the unobservable such that it conforms, on
average, to this set of probabilities. The treatment effect is then re-estimated for each
draw having included the unobservable as a covariate, and this exercise is repeated across
multiple draws and with different combinations of the probabilities characterising the
unobservable.
We adapt Ichino et al. (2008)’s method for characterising the distribution of the unob-
servable, even as our set-up is more similar toRosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who use a
logit model to estimate the effect of a binary treatment on a binary outcome. In our
case, ‘treatment’ is the categorical variable of caste-group belonging, and outcome is the
binary loan-approval. Caste-group cannot be manipulated in reality, but conceptually
we are studying the consequences that would arise as if it could. And any caste-wise
differences in loan approval calculated by averaging over the full sample (as we did in
table 3) are in effect estimates of this treatment effect.
Further, our focus is on potential discrimination against STs. Therefore, while we include
all four caste categories when analysing caste-wise probabilities of loan approval, we
simplify caste to STs and non-STs for the purpose of constructing the unobservable ‘credit
histories’. This maintains tractability, but more importantly, is intuitively appealing: our
results thus far suggest that differences in loan approvals between Brahmins, OBCs and
SCs are negligible, and it is the gap between these groups and STs that potentially suggest
institutional discrimination.
4.1.1 Constructing the unobservable
Let H denote hitherto unobserved credit histories, where for household i, Hi can either
be 1 (good history) or 0 (poor history). Let ST denote ST-group belonging with STi = 1
for STs, and STi = 0 all other caste-groups. And, let Y denote the loan outcome, with
Yi = 1 if the loan is approved and Yi = 0 if it is denied.
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We can now partition the set of observations as {Y = i, ST = j}, i, j ∈ {0, 1}. For
instance, {Y = 0, ST = 1} denotes the set of households who are ST and who have been
denied loans. Following Ichino et al. (2008), let pij be defined as
pij = Prob(H = 1|Y = i, ST = j), i, j ∈ {0, 1} (2)
Then the set {p00, p01, p10, p11} fully characterises the distribution of H.
Now, let θij denote the proportion of the sample in each of the sets {Y = i, ST = j}
where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. And let the proportion of STs (non-STs) with good credit histories
be denoted µST (respectively, µnonST ).
Then
p11θ11 + p01θ01 = µST (3)
p10θ10 + p00θ00 = µnonST (4)
An intuitive way of interpreting these numbers is as follows.
Suppose that banks base loan approval at least in part on the presence of a good credit
history, and let Prob(Y = 1|H = 1, ST = i) = bST=i where i ∈ {0, 1}. Taste-based
discrimination on the part of banks would lead to different values of b for STs and non-
STs, whereas purely statistical discrimination would not. To be conservative in our
analysis in an attempt to see if statistical discrimination can be ruled out, we assume a
single value b = bST=1 = bST=0 for all households. Then, p11 = p10 = b.
Also, we want to investigate whether STs having poorer credit histories could be an
explanation for the apparently lower rates of loan approval. Therefore we assume that
µnonST > µST . Let STgap = µnonST − µST , i.e. the proportion by which non-STs have
better credit histories than do STs.
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We can now rewrite equations 3 and 4 as
bθ11 + p01θ01 = µST (5)
bθ10 + p00θ00 = µST + STgap (6)
Since p01 and p00 can be calculated using 5 and 6, the distribution of H can be fully
characterised in terms of three parameters: the degree to which banks base loan approvals
on credit histories (b), the proportion of STs with good credit histories (µST ), and the gap
between this proportion and the corresponding (assumed higher) proportion for non-STs
(STgap).
Note that not all combinations of {b, µST , STgap} are feasible. Rearranging 5 and 6 we
get
1 ≥ p01 ≥ 0 ⇔ 1 ≥ µST − bθ11
θ01
≥ 0 (7)
1 ≥ p00 ≥ 0 ⇔ 1 ≥ µST + STgap − bθ10
θ00
≥ 0 (8)
Furthermore, since each of b, µST , and µST + STgap are proportions:
1 ≥ b ≥ 0 (9)
1 ≥ µST ≥ 0 (10)
1 ≥ µST + STgap ≥ 0 (11)
In general, STgap cannot be very high unless b is high too. The θ terms are all sample
16
statistics. For STs, we have θ11 = 0.815 and θ01 = 0.185, while for non-STs we have
θ10 = 0.925 and θ00 = 0.075. We restrict {b, µST , STgap} to multiples of 0.01 between 0.01
and 0.99, and appendix B provides a graphical summary of all feasible {b, µST , STgap}
combinations where feasibility is defined by equations 7-11. The most ‘adverse’ feasible
combination in terms of maximum STgap is {b, µST , STgap} = {0.98, 0.8, 0.18}.
4.1.2 Results
Based on the logic of omitted variables in standard regression analysis, if credit histories
do explain residual inter-caste differences in loan approvals then once H in included in
the model we would expect:
1. For a given b and µST , the residual gap between STs and non-STs will decrease
with higher values of STgap. This is because more of what used to be a residual gap
would in fact be accounted for STs having worse credit histories.
2. For given b and STgap, the residual gap between STs and non-STs will decrease with
lower values of µST . Since the ratio of non-STs with good histories to that of STs is
µST+STgap
µST
, this ratio increases the smaller µST gets. Again, the inclusion of H will
account for more of the ST v. non-ST gap the larger this ratio, or the smaller µST .
We reestimate our results for several specifications of H in terms of {b, µST , STgap}. For
a given combination of {b, STgap}, we select the minimum feasible µST so as to maximise
the potential confounding influence of H. H is simulated using Monte Carlo draws from
distribution corresponding to each {b, µST , STgap} combination 300 times. For each draw,
we then re-estimate the Logit model for loan approval having included H as an additional
regressor. All other available covariates (model 4 in table 2) are also included.
For each regression, we calculate the sample-average caste-wise probabilities. The re-
sult in table 3 suggested that STs were 5-7% less likely to receive a loan than non-STs
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(Brahmins, OBCs, SCs). To compare the results from the simulation exercise that in-
cludes H with this original result, we summarise the ST vs non-ST difference in loan
approval probabilities using box plots. To also account for the standard errors of these
predictions, we also conduct a Wald test each time for the null that caste-wise average
predicted probabilities are equal.
Figure 1 summarises these results. The top box plot in each case summarises the ST
vs non-ST gap in predicted loan approval probabilities, while the bottom box plot sum-
marises the p-values for corresponding Wald tests. These show that the gap in predicted
probabilities of loan approval between STs and non-STs remains robust to the inclusion
of H for many but not all combinations of {b, STgap}. If loans are (very) strongly con-
ditional on good credit histories (b = 0.98), then STs no longer have lower rates of loan
approval with even modest differences between their credit histories and those of non-STs
(STgap = 0.18, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05).
That said, b = 0.98 implies that good credit histories would be compulsory for loan
approvals, and this level of dependence would appear implausible in the rural Indian
context. For lower levels of b, i.e. the dependence between loan approvals and credit
histories, the gap in loan approvals for ST and non-STs stays relatively unchanged at
about 5%, and for some cases (e.g. b = 0.4) the range of simulated values includes higher
gaps as well. Throughout, the median p-value for these comparisons is no more than 0.05
with three exceptions (b = 0.8, STgap = 0.1; b = 0.6, STgap = 0.1; b = 0.4, STgap = 0.05).
Appendix B presents corresponding box plots for the same estimations that summarise
the gap between STs and the caste group with the minimum average predicted probability.
This is a more conservative estimate of the ST vs non-ST gap, and these results confirm
the pattern as figure 1, but with a gap that is about 1% less. The same appendix
also presents boxplots of p-values from Wald tests for the joint equality of predicted
probabilities across all four caste-groups. These are also very similar to the p-values in
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figure 1.
Do banks discriminate against ST borrowers? The results from this simulation exercise
suggest that the answer is a qualified yes, since the residual effects of caste-group belong-
ing are robust to the inclusion of hitherto unobserved credit histories for most, but not
all specifications. Provided bank lending is not strongly predicated on good credit histo-
ries, the gap between STs and non-STs in most cases remains on average (in the sense of
median) in the vicinity of 5% even after accounting for credit histories. This remains so
(for b = 0.4 and b = 0.6) even if the proportion of STs with good credit histories is 0.1
lower than the corresponding proportion for non-STs.
4.2 Small farmers
The Reserve Bank of India has long recognised the challenges faced by small and marginal
farmers in accessing agricultural loans. Its policy guidance has encouraged banks to set
aside a proportion of overall lending for the ‘priority sector’, and within this certain
‘weaker sections’, which include small farmers (Reserve Bank of India, 2007). Small
farmers are defined by land holdings of 5 acres or less. Therefore, we next estimate our
results separately for small farmers and for farmers who own more than 5 acres of land,
to examine whether there is supportive evidence towards this policy’s effectiveness.
The top half of table 4 presents these results. As in the preceding section, the model
specification used includes all available covariates, and appendix A presents the full re-
gression results. We can see that inter-caste differences in application rates are stark only
for large farmers. For small farmers there exist minor differences suggestive of the pattern
we witness in the full sample, but their magnitude is far smaller. Similarly, looking at
loan approvals, potential discrimination against STs is apparent only for large farmers;
for small farmers the loan approval rates are indistinguishable across caste groups.
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This suggests that RBI guidance for lending to weaker sections may well be proving
effective, even though our data do not allow us to examine this question directly. Not
only are loan approval rates essentially equal across caste groups for small farmers, they
are also slightly higher than the corresponding rates for large farmers. The same goes
for loan application rates, in that small farmers are slightly more likely to apply for
loans, and significant inter-caste differences exist only for large farmers. It would appear
that banks use less discretion in lending to small farmers, and having experienced this
willingness over time, small farmers are more likely to apply for loans.
4.3 States with significant ST populations
We now analyse our findings further by focusing on two issues of specific policy relevance:
the demographic significance of STs, and the role of land ownership.
First, and as table 1 shows, STs are a substantive proportion in a few states but a very
small minority in most others. It is possible that patterns of loan application and approval
are different for states which have substantive ST populations, therefore we reestimate
our results for these and the remaining states separately. Five states in our sample have
an ST population proportion of at least 20%: Jharkhand (50%), Chhattisgarh (42%),
Madhya Pradesh (21%), Orissa (21%) and Gujarat (19%).7
The bottom half of table 4 summarise the loan application and approval probabilities for
these five states and the remaining 13 states. The specification used is the same as model
4 in table 2, which uses all available covariates. Full regression results are presented in
appendix A.
These probabilities suggest that the lower loan approval rates for STs in the full sample
7Population proportions as a whole, and not just farmers, are Jharkhand (37%), Chhattisgarh (41%),
Madhya Pradesh (17%), Orissa (18%) and Gujarat (13%). These are still the five states with the highest
proportion of STs.
21
Ta
bl
e
4:
P
re
di
ct
ed
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
fo
r
su
bp
op
ul
at
io
n
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
Lo
an
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
Lo
an
ap
pr
ov
al
s
B
ra
h
m
in
O
B
C
S
C
S
T
B
ra
h
m
in
O
B
C
S
C
S
T
S
m
al
l
fa
rm
er
s
0.
36
6
0.
43
0
0.
35
0
0.
37
0
0.
93
9
0.
93
9
0.
92
8
0.
92
5
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
33
)
p-
va
lu
es
0.
09
0
0.
93
7
L
ar
ge
fa
rm
er
s
0.
33
3
0.
37
1
0.
30
5
0.
26
1
0.
90
8
0.
94
0
0.
93
7
0.
85
2
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
37
)
p-
va
lu
es
0.
00
1
0.
02
1
S
ta
te
s
w
it
h
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
0.
33
2
0.
31
6
0.
23
9
0.
25
7
0.
96
4
0.
90
4
0.
89
9
0.
81
7
S
T
p
op
u
la
ti
on
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
40
)
p-
va
lu
es
0.
05
4
0.
01
2
R
em
ai
n
in
g
st
at
es
0.
31
4
0.
37
1
0.
29
8
0.
26
7
0.
90
3
0.
93
7
0.
92
6
0.
88
6
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
46
)
p-
va
lu
es
0.
00
3
0.
28
3
N
ot
es
:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
sa
m
pl
e-
av
er
ag
e
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
by
ca
st
e
gr
ou
p
fo
r
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
su
bp
op
ul
at
io
ns
fr
om
L
og
it
m
od
el
s
us
in
g
al
l
av
ai
la
bl
e
co
va
ri
at
es
.
T
hu
s
th
es
e
ar
e
th
e
sa
m
e
as
m
od
el
4
in
ta
bl
e
2.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
an
d
p-
va
lu
es
sh
ow
n
ar
e
fo
r
W
al
d
te
st
s
fo
r
th
e
nu
ll
th
at
th
e
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
ar
e
eq
ua
l
ac
ro
ss
al
l
fo
ur
ca
st
e
ca
te
go
ri
es
.
22
arise from states where STs are a substantial proportion of the population. States where
STs are a very small part of the population do have lower approval rates for ST, but these
are only marginally lower than those for non-STs, a trend confirmed by the corresponding
p-values as well. It is worth noting that this result is similar to Das et al’s (2012) finding
that poverty reduction rates are slower amongst STs who reside in states with significant
ST populations.
Unfortunately we are unable to consider North-Eastern states in our analysis, where STs
are a significant proportion of the population and the majority in some. This limitation
is due to the sample size available. There are only 33 farmer households in our data who
applied for credit in these states, of which 17 received a loan, thus making it impractical
to use regression analysis to model any caste-wise differences. That said, these states are
also culturally and economically isolated from other parts of India, have sparser bank
networks, and are thus likely to be distinct from the 18 states we are focusing on.
5 Discussion
The Government of India’s attempts to deepen financial access by directing banks to lend
to SC and ST caste-groups are implicitly based on the assumption that barriers to access
lie with lenders. Our analysis partially bears this assumption out, since we find that
ST group borrowers are, after controlling for other characteristics, less likely to receive a
loan conditional on having applied for one (85% versus 90-93% for the other three caste
groups).
However, our analysis also indicates that such directed lending will not alleviate a major
component of inter-caste differences in financial access, since there are corresponding,
systemic differences between caste groups in loan application rates. Specifically, SCs
and STs are less likely to apply for agricultural loans compared to OBC and higher
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castes. This pattern remains after controlling for various household characteristics, and
is qualitatively similar to that of disadvantage and difference in these characteristics. If
we take the view that these application rates are at least in part driven by expectations,
then it follows that expectations too differ by caste-group in ways similar to incomes,
land ownership, or education.
Gary Becker’s definition of discrimination places the onus on lenders, wherein discrimina-
tion is said to occur if race or other group-based differences remain even after accounting
for all characteristics that are relevant to the lending decision. By this definition, if
members of one group are characterised by having fewer loans on average because they
are less likely to seek credit, these differences would not represent discrimination. Our
findings thus indicate that discrimination does likely take place, but while no less serious,
it is limited essentially to one caste group (STs). The other inter-caste differences in loan
incidence are effectively explained by differences in application rates.
Yet in the Indian context, Dréze et al. (1997) have argued that the distinction between
lender discrimination and differences in application rates is largely irrelevant, because
any hesitation to apply for a loan in fact reflects differences in expectations that are
based on experiences that might span several years or more. That is, lower-caste persons
might apply less frequently because they have learned, possibly as a community if not
as individuals, that they are less likely to receive loans. In this view caste-wise differ-
ences would still reflect discrimination once lending-relevant characteristics are taken into
account, but crucially, irrespective of whether a loan was actually applied for or not.
This is an important perspective for understanding the nature and extent of caste-based
differences. Nonetheless, we believe that it is crucial to consider loan applications and
approvals separately, because the role of caste has different policy implications for each
process.
Our finding that caste-wise patterns are largely explained by application rates suggests
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that policies such as subsidised interest rates or the lowering of collateral requirements
are unlikely to reduce all inter-caste differences in credit access. In the short term,
loan application rates will be the binding constraint on financial inclusion, and this will
improve only once the expectations underlying the demand for credit witness change. The
latter changes could take several years whereby these policies, complemented by policies
in other realms of economic life, would gradually change borrowers’ expectations, helping
dissipate the hesitation to seek credit.
However, our finding that STs face lower rates of loan approval suggest that a focus on
banks’ lending practices, potentially coupled with incentives to lend to ST borrowers,
could yield swift improvements for this group. Such policies would be relevant mainly for
states where STs are a significant proportion of the population, since we have shown that
it is in these states that STs face consistent disadvantage in access to credit. Caste-wise
differences in credit access due to banks’ unwillingness to lend to STs, potentially due
to discrimination, could thus be alleviated. STs would still have lower rates of financial
access on account of lower application rates, but overall access would still improve over
what is currently witnessed.
Finally, our finding that caste-wise differences are significantly muted for small farmers –
those who own less than 5 acres of land – is consistent with the RBI’s guidance on lending.
We cannot support this claim directly, but it would seem that the RBI’s long-standing
encouragement of lending to weaker sections of society, of which small farmers are a part,
is effective. Not only do we find no evidence of caste discrimination in lending to small
farmers, but crucially, it seems that expectations about obtaining loans are also positive,
so much so that small farmer SCs and STs are more likely to apply for loans relative to
the full sample.
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A Logit regression results
Tables 5 and 6 show the logit regression results for the full sample loan applications and
approvals, respectively. All models contain state fixed effects and robust standard errors
that account for village-level clustering.
Tables 7 and 8 shows subpopulation-wise Logit regression results for loan applications and
approvals, respectively. These subpopulations are defined according to land ownership
and ST population proportions. These are the full regression results for sections 4.3 and
4.2. All models contain state fixed effects and robust standard errors that account for
village-level clustering.
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Table 5: Logit regression results: loan applications
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Brahmin (base)
OBC 0.0209 0.200∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.105) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104)
SC -0.589∗∗∗ -0.221 -0.167 -0.177
(0.134) (0.139) (0.141) (0.141)
ST -0.761∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.326∗ -0.293∗
(0.152) (0.162) (0.167) (0.174)
(log) Land owned 0.583∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0554) (0.0544)
(log) Land rented in 0.169∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.0547) (0.0537) (0.0542)
(log) Land rented out -0.138∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.144∗∗
(0.0713) (0.0719) (0.0727)
Cons exp 0.457∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.0684) (0.0824) (0.0831)
HH income -0.000000439∗ -0.000000505∗∗ -0.000000504∗∗
(0.000000225) (0.000000228) (0.000000228)
age HH head -0.000363 -0.000246
(0.00317) (0.00317)
sex HH head 0.620∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.227)
Years of edu highest male 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0486∗∗∗
(0.00954) (0.00948)
Years of edu highest female 0.00978 0.00961
(0.00967) (0.00956)
HH size -0.0128 -0.0141
(0.0193) (0.0194)
HH prop adult males -0.269 -0.293
(0.281) (0.280)
HH prop adult females -0.0299 -0.00953
(0.318) (0.317)
distance to nearest town 0.134∗
(0.0749)
% HHs with electricity 0.0858∗
(0.0461)
distance closest bank branch 0.0470
(0.0540)
Constant -1.925∗∗∗ -8.014∗∗∗ -7.406∗∗∗ -8.399∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.789) (0.942) (1.068)
N 7510 7510 7510 7510
Standard errors in parentheses and account for village-level clustering
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state fixed effects
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Table 6: Logit regression results: loan approvals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Brahmin (base)
OBC 0.0940 0.224 0.327 0.327
(0.277) (0.266) (0.259) (0.264)
SC -0.194 0.0329 0.262 0.257
(0.356) (0.348) (0.329) (0.330)
ST -0.998∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗ -0.615∗ -0.613∗
(0.368) (0.359) (0.364) (0.343)
(log) Land owned 0.537∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.157) (0.160)
(log) Land rented in 0.421∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.144) (0.144)
(log) Land rented out -0.158 -0.190 -0.200
(0.165) (0.178) (0.174)
Cons exp -0.0673 -0.0114 -0.00879
(0.175) (0.176) (0.175)
income -6.84e-08 -4.61e-08 -5.69e-08
(0.000000370) (0.000000392) (0.000000378)
Age HH head -0.0174∗∗ -0.0174∗∗
(0.00754) (0.00758)
sex HH head 0.403 0.406
(0.335) (0.335)
Years of edu highest male 0.00103 0.0000883
(0.0281) (0.0283)
Years of edu highest female 0.0540∗ 0.0538∗
(0.0310) (0.0311)
HH size -0.0744∗ -0.0725∗
(0.0402) (0.0405)
HH propn adult males 1.798∗ 1.800∗
(0.925) (0.936)
HH propn adult females -0.158 -0.209
(0.961) (0.961)
distance to nearest town 0.0283
(0.179)
% HHs with electricity -0.0207
(0.116)
distance closest bank branch -0.131
(0.115)
Constant 2.815∗∗∗ 2.622 1.781 2.030
(0.785) (2.062) (2.216) (2.444)
N 2587 2587 2587 2587
Standard errors in parentheses and account for village-level clustering
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state fixed effects
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Table 7: Subpopulation logit regression: loan applications
Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states
Brahmin (base)
OBC 0.385∗ 0.204∗ -0.0896 0.319∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.114) (0.191) (0.120)
SC -0.103 -0.157 -0.552∗∗ -0.0946
(0.234) (0.180) (0.263) (0.164)
ST 0.0219 -0.413∗∗ -0.434∗ -0.285
(0.317) (0.197) (0.251) (0.271)
(log) land owned 1.155∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.0807) (0.0905) (0.0661)
(log) land rent in 0.259∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ -0.0644 0.255∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.0634) (0.0775) (0.0676)
(log) land rented out -0.952∗∗ -0.124∗ -0.0837 -0.173∗
(0.459) (0.0732) (0.0993) (0.0945)
cons. exp. 0.144 0.400∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.141) (0.105) (0.126) (0.1000)
income 4.46e-08 -0.000000487∗∗ -0.00000108∗∗∗ -0.000000254
(0.000000332) (0.000000231) (0.000000414) (0.000000211)
age HH head 0.00880 -0.00409 0.000761 -0.00130
(0.00627) (0.00366) (0.00473) (0.00396)
sex HH head 0.110 0.775∗∗∗ 0.464 0.680∗∗
(0.425) (0.254) (0.306) (0.281)
Years of edu highest male 0.0545∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0113)
Years of edu highest female 0.00780 0.00880 -0.0277 0.0206∗
(0.0191) (0.0116) (0.0177) (0.0111)
HH size 0.0104 -0.0221 -0.0420 -0.00800
(0.0427) (0.0215) (0.0292) (0.0232)
HH propn adult males -0.0950 -0.425 -0.662 -0.166
(0.547) (0.323) (0.442) (0.353)
HH propn adult females -0.263 0.0980 0.507 -0.240
(0.606) (0.385) (0.531) (0.395)
distance to nearest town/city 0.0437 0.175∗∗ -0.0840 0.237∗∗
(0.122) (0.0854) (0.115) (0.0951)
% HH with electricity 0.0577 0.106∗ 0.115 0.0667
(0.0668) (0.0602) (0.0854) (0.0541)
distance to nearest bank -0.00965 0.0678 0.00524 0.0614
(0.0892) (0.0606) (0.0934) (0.0651)
Constant -6.931∗∗∗ -8.513∗∗∗ -10.73∗∗∗ -7.632∗∗∗
(1.748) (1.361) (1.486) (1.288)
N 2489 5021 2459 5051
Standard errors in parentheses and account for village-level clustering
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All models contain state fixed effects
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Table 8: Subpopulation logit regression: loan approvals
Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states
Brahmin (base)
OBC -0.0111 0.518 -1.423∗ 0.504∗
(0.487) (0.317) (0.830) (0.293)
SC -0.241 0.450 -1.511∗ 0.325
(0.616) (0.399) (0.914) (0.360)
ST -0.297 -0.598 -2.447∗∗∗ -0.198
(0.668) (0.377) (0.853) (0.533)
(log) land owned 1.264∗∗∗ 0.358 1.013∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗
(0.430) (0.251) (0.350) (0.187)
(log) land rent in 0.899∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.612∗ 0.434∗∗
(0.275) (0.197) (0.357) (0.169)
(log) land rented out 0.0361 -0.148 -0.0457 -0.275
(0.679) (0.184) (0.222) (0.204)
cons. exp. -0.162 0.122 -0.377 0.0118
(0.450) (0.207) (0.353) (0.206)
income 0.00000333 -0.000000380 -0.00000202∗∗∗ 0.000000193
(0.00000256) (0.000000565) (0.000000716) (0.000000733)
age HH head -0.0134 -0.0192∗∗ -0.0299∗∗ -0.0160∗
(0.0142) (0.00912) (0.0144) (0.00941)
sex HH head 1.193∗∗ 0.0794 -0.514 0.659∗
(0.563) (0.487) (0.684) (0.365)
Years of edu highest male 0.00196 0.0195 -0.0681 0.0125
(0.0422) (0.0368) (0.0488) (0.0325)
Years of edu highest female 0.147∗∗∗ 0.000274 0.0789 0.0465
(0.0516) (0.0366) (0.0502) (0.0369)
HH size -0.278∗∗∗ -0.00664 0.117 -0.0929∗∗
(0.0875) (0.0539) (0.101) (0.0444)
HH propn adult males 2.766∗ 0.955 1.778 1.915
(1.511) (1.178) (1.437) (1.199)
HH propn adult females -0.0335 0.0760 1.398 -0.511
(1.768) (1.140) (1.529) (1.180)
Distance nearest town/city -0.429 0.269 -0.152 0.148
(0.318) (0.208) (0.305) (0.215)
% HH with electricity -0.343∗∗ 0.148 0.0951 -0.120
(0.175) (0.146) (0.202) (0.105)
Distance nearest bank -0.125 -0.161 -0.251 -0.109
(0.199) (0.153) (0.205) (0.139)
Constant 3.993 15.20 3.282 1.738
(5.780) (.) (4.404) (2.864)
N 476 2111 854 1733
Standard errors in parentheses and account for village clustering
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions contain state fixed effects.
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B Details of the simulation exercise
Figure 2 summarises the values of {b, µST , STgap} that satisfy the following constraints:
1 ≥ p01 ≥ 0 ⇔ 1 ≥ µST − bθ11
θ01
≥ 0 (12)
1 ≥ p00 ≥ 0 ⇔ 1 ≥ µST + STgap − bθ10
θ00
≥ 0 (13)
1 ≥ b ≥ 0 (14)
1 ≥ µST ≥ 0 (15)
1 ≥ µST + STgap ≥ 0 (16)
Figure 2: Feasible parameter values for the simulation exercise
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Figure 3 is similar to figure 1 in the main text, and presents a slightly different way of
summarising the results from our simulation exercise. Instead of calculating the difference
in predicted probabilities of loan approval for STs and the average of non-STs (Brahmins,
OBCs, SCs), here we calculate the difference between average predicted probabilities
for STs and the minimum of those for Brahmins, OBCs and SCs. This difference is
thus a more conservative estimate of the ST vs non-ST gap in loan approvals. The
distribution of these differences across 1000 simulations for each combination of {b, STgap}
are summarised using box plots.
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